Abstract In this paper, a new (k, n) verifiable secret image sharing scheme (VSISS) is proposed in which third order LFSR (linear-feedback shift register)-based public key cryptosystem is applied for the cheating prevention and preview before decryption. In the proposed scheme the secret image is first partitioned into several non-overlapping blocks of k pixels. Every k pixel is then used to form m ¼ dk=4e þ 1 pixels of one encrypted share. The original secret image can be reconstructed by gathering any k or more encrypted shared images. The experimental results show that the proposed VSISS is an efficient and safe method.
Introduction
With rapid growth of networking technology, digital data can be transferred easily over the Internet. But security and protection of sensitive digital information during transmission is a great concern in commercial, medical and military applications. Two methods cryptography [1, 2] and data hiding [3] have been used to increase the security of the digital data such as images. Nevertheless, one of the common vulnerabilities of both these methods is ''single point of failure'' (SPOF) as they use single storage mechanism and therefore data can be easily misplaced or damaged. Secret image sharing schemes (SISS) are useful options. The basic idea behind secret sharing is to transform a secret into n number of ''shadows'' or ''shares'' that can be carried and stored disjointedly. The secret can only be restored from any k shadows (k 6 n) and any (k À 1) or fewer shadows cannot reveal anything close to that secret.
The secret sharing schemes (SIS) were first introduced by Blakley [4] and Shamir [5] separately in 1979. Shamir's secret sharing scheme is a (k, n) threshold-based secret sharing scheme. It is based on (k À 1) degree polynomial and Lagrange interpolation. In 2002, Thien and Lin [6] proposed an (k, n) threshold based secret image sharing scheme (SISS) by extending Shamir's polynomial approach. In their scheme, the pixel value larger than 250 is always truncated to 250 before the generation of shares. This loss of pixel value has the truncation distortion which is the chief drawback of Thien-Lin scheme. Thien's work attracted many researchers to suggest different techniques which are applied in the literature [7, 8] . Recently, Wu [9] has smartly solved the ''truncation distortion'' problem.
Blakley's proposed secret sharing scheme is established by using geometric approach. According to his method, the secret is a point in a k-dimensional space and the hyper-planes in that space are defined by the n number of shadows. For sharing of secret image, Blakley's geometric approach has been taken by Chen-Fu [10] . The probability of only containing one shared image to obtain the secret image of Chen-Fu is higher than Lin-Thien's scheme. In 2008, Tso first quantized the secret image and then applied Blakley's concepts to share the quantized image [11] . However, due to quantization errors, reconstructed image is not distortion free.
Another common drawback of all the above (k, n) threshold secret image sharing schemes is the lack of the property of verification, i.e. in all these schemes it is presumed that the original secret image holder known as the dealer and the participants are not cheated. However, the following two situations may also arise:
(1) The cheating by the dealer: A dealer may provide a fake share to a particular participant. (2) The cheating by a participant: One participant may supply a fake shadow to the other participants.
In [7] , the author proposed verifiable secret image sharing scheme (VSISS) in which the cheaters (a dishonest dealer or a dishonest participant) can easily be distinguished. Merely as the authors of [7] adopted Thien-Lin scheme for share generation and secret reconstruction, their scheme suffers from the major drawback of Thien-Lin which has already been hashed out before. Thus to perfectly recover, Zhao employed the technique of carving up a pixel whose value is larger than 250 into two which charge extra storage. In [12] , Wu et al. proposed a secret sharing scheme based on cellular automata. Though Wu et al. remove the problems of truncation distortion or pixel division it does not bring out any verification to identify cheaters.
In this paper, we propose a novel (k, n) threshold verifiable secret image sharing scheme (VSISS) which generates encrypted shares. The proposed method can identify cheaters and recover the original secret without any deprivation. Moreover the probability of guessing of one correct shared image of the proposed method is minimized.
Preliminaries

The 3rd order LFSR sequence
In this section we briefly present the 3rd order linear-feedback shift register (LFSR) sequence [13] . Let f(x) be an irreducible polynomial over F = GF(p), where p is a prime. Then f(x) is defined as
A sequence S ¼ S t f g is a third-order homogeneous LFSR sequence with a characteristic polynomial f(x) if the elements of S satisfy the following recursive relation
where S 0 ¼ 3; S 1 ¼ a and S 2 ¼ a 2 À 2b, then f(x) generates the characteristic sequence S = {S t }. We represent S t as S t a; b ð Þor S t (f), and S as S(a, b) or S(f).
Assume that a 1 , a 2 , a 3 are all three roots of f(x) in the splitting field of f(x) over F. According to Newton's formula, the elements of S can be represented by the symmetric tth power sum of the roots as follows:
The period of f(x) is denoted as per(f). 
only if f t (x) is irreducible over F.
Theorem 1 ([13]
). Let f(x) = x 3 À ax 2 + bx À 1 be a polynomial over F, and let S be the characteristic sequence generated by f(x). Then for all positive integers t and e, S t ðS e ða; bÞ; S Àe ða; bÞÞ ¼ S te ða; bÞ ¼ S e ðS t ða; bÞ; S Àt ða; bÞÞ ð4Þ
The theorem 1 has been proved in [13] . This theorem guarantees the commutative property. If we consider a and b as variables in F and t as a fixed integer, then S t (a, b) and S Àt (a, b) are Waring polynomials. 
Otherwise, S t (a, b) and S t (a, b) are orthogonal in F in variables a and b.
Lemma 2 ([14]
). Let f(x) = x 3 À ax 2 + bx À 1 be an irreducible polynomial over F of the period Q = p 2 + p + 1 and S = {S t } be the characteristic sequence generated by f(x). Let t and t 0 be different coset leaders modulo Q, and both t and t 0 are relatively prime to Q. Then
Lemma 2 provides a one-to-one correspondence between the private key space and the public key space. Fact 1 together with Lemma 2 can be used to construct a public key encryption scheme, which is described in next section.
The LFSR-based public key cryptography
In this section, we introduce the LFSR-based public key cryptography by the 3rd order characteristic sequences. We apply the following steps to select the public and private keys:
1. Choose two secret prime number p and q.
Calculate the period U of the irreducible polynomial as U = (p 2 + p + 1)(q 2 + q + 1). 4. Choose a random integer e with gcd(e, p i À 1) = 1 for i = 2, 3.
5. Compute f so that f · e = 1 mod U. 6. Public keys: (e, N). 7. Private key: f.
Encryption: If the plaintext P = (P 1 , P 2 ), where 0 < P 1 , P 2 < N, the cipher text C = (C 1 , C 2 ) can be generated by C 1 = S e (P 1 , P 2 ) and C 2 = S Àe (P 1 , P 2 ).
Decryption: The plaintext P = (P 1 , P 2 ) can be generated from the given the cipher text C = (C 1 , C 2 ) as P 1 = S f (C 1 , C 2 ) and P 2 = S Àf (C 1 , C 2 ).
Proposed secret image sharing scheme (SISS)
In this section we propose a verifiable (k, n) secret image sharing scheme based on the 3rd order LFSR-based public key cryptosystem [13] for verification. Our proposed verifiable secret image sharing scheme (VSISS) consists of three phases: Initialization phase, share generation and reconstruction. Section 3.1 presents initialization phase, Section 3.2 presents the proposed share generation scheme and Section 3.3 introduces the verification and recovery strategy.
Initialization phase
Dealer (original secret holder) D first selects two prime number p and q to calculate N = p · q and two positive integers a and
On the other hand, each participant A i (1 6 i 6 n) also selects a random number e i from the interval where m is defined as
Share construction phase
The share construction phase generates n encrypted shadow images of size mÂMÂN k from a secret image I s of size M · N where 2 6 k 6 n. The steps of share generation are listed given below:
1. The dealer D randomly chooses an integer e 0 , where e 0 2 {2 to U}. Then D computes f such that f · e 0 = 1 mod U. Here U is the period of
. ., n. Publishes {R 0 , f}. 3. Generate a permutation sequence by a secret key K S . 4. Obtain permuted image I 0 by permuting the pixels of original secret image with the help of permutation sequence generated in step 3. 5. Set i to 1.
6. Divide the Secret Image into T number of non-overlapping blocks B t f g 
is also divided into k non-overlapping blocks of length k bits in such a way that k Â k M i j j ( Á j j represents the length). 9. Each jth (1 6 j 6 k) block is converted into k bits number a j , where a j 2 f0; 1; . . . ; ð2 k À 1Þg. 10. Create an equation based on k consecutive pixels {R 1 , R 2 , . . ., R k } of block B t (generated in step 6) as
11. S t is converted into r = (8 + 2k) bits number as b rÀ1 . . .b 1 b 0 . 12. Compute x = (8m À r). If r " 8m, then go to step 13.
Otherwise i.e. if r = 8m, then go to step 14. 
14. Obtain m gray (8 bits) pixels from 8m bit sequence (generated in step 12). Step 1 and step 2 ensure that all participants can work together to verify whether one or more participant among them are cheaters. This verification could be performed without revealing the corresponding shares. In other words, even if any (k À 1) verified participants gather their shares, then also revealing the original secret is not possible. Because (k À 1) verified participants can create exactly (k À 1) numbers of equations of type (11) which is insufficient to obtain the values of k number of variables (in this case the values of R 1t , R 2t , -. . ., R kt ). To obtain the values of R 1t , R 2t , . . ., R kt at least k equations of type (11) are required. Thus the proposed scheme fulfills the requirement of Shamir's (k, n) secret sharing (SS) scheme i.e. using proposed VSISS any k or more than k shadow images can reconstruct the original secret image, but any (k À 1) cannot reveal any information. 
Experimental results and discussion
Experimental results
This
Analysis of correlation coefficient
The correlation coefficient r xy between a pair of random variables (x, y) can be calculated by the following formula: 
In our experiment (x, y) pair chosen as one pair of adjacent pixels in vertical, horizontal and diagonal directions. To compute the correlation coefficients of pairs of adjacent pixels, we choose 2048 random pairs of neighboring pixels in all three directions from the secret image and encrypted shared images. The correlation coefficients of two adjacent pixels in Fig. 1 in all three directions are listed in Table 1 and compared with the results in Refs. [2, 12] . With regard to obtained results listed in Table 1 it is clear that the pixels in the encrypted shares of the proposed method are in feeble correlations, then the encryption result is quite serious.
Analysis of structural similarity index metric (SSIM)
To check how dissimilar the encrypted shares from each other, we have used another well-known quality metric know as the Structural Similarity Index Metric (SSIM). It was developed by Wang et al. [15] 
where l X and l Y are the mean intensity of X and Y respectively, r 2 X and r 2 Y are the variance of X and Y respectively; r XY the covariance between X and Y.
2 are two variables to stabilize the division with weak denominator and L is the dynamic range of the pixel-values chosen as L = 255. The value of k 1 (1) and k 2 (1) is chosen as k 1 = 0.01; k 2 = 0.03. SSIM values of share images for our experimentation are given in Table 2 . The SSIM values of Table 2 shows that each encrypted share is totally dissimilar from the other encrypted shares. These strengthen the claim of the security of the proposed method.
Cheating prevention
Each participant can easily prevent cheating before secret image reconstruction by verifying that if another participant provides correct or faulty data. Theorem 2 analyzes the verification capability of the proposed scheme. Hence the proposed method has the power to preclude cheating. On the other hand, the scheme [6, [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] does not support verification thus cannot prevent cheating. The length of the key (private/public) used in cheating prevention is shorter in comparison with Zhao et al.'s [7] scheme for same for the same degree of protection. 
Computation overhead
The proposed scheme uses an LFSR-based public key cryptosystem for cheating prevention. The LFSR is a one-way function which has lower computation cost than exponentiation function [16] . Hence the proposed scheme has low computational overhead for cheating prevention than Zhao et al.'s scheme as it involves exponentiation computation for cheating prevention.
Security of the proposed scheme
The security of the proposed scheme is employed according to the 3rd order LFSR-based public key cryptosystem. This section presents the resistance capability of the proposed scheme against the attacks such as brute-force attack and collusion attack: . This probability is really
depressed; yet less than the probability of Li et al.'s [17] scheme. Thus the proposed scheme is completely secure scheme that could protect the original secret against the brute force attack in a high probability. Fig. 1 (d) 0.0058 2 À0.0010 Fig. 1 (e) 0.0074 3 À0.0027 Fig. 1 (f) 0.0022 4 0.0090 Fig. 1 (g) 0.0014 Fig. 1 (h) 0.0047 Vertical 0.9132 Fig. 1 (c) À0.0091 0.0021 1 0.0211 Fig. 1 (d) 0.0064 2 À0.0101 Fig. 1 (e) 0.0029 3 0.0097 Fig. 1 (f) 0.0012 4 À0.089 Fig. 1 (g) 0.0108 Fig. 1 (h) 0.0052 Diagonal 0.9428 Fig. 1 (c) 0.0021 À0.0038 1 À0.0074 Fig. 1 (d) 0.0053 2 0.0056 Fig. 1 (e) À0.0029 3 À0.0101 Fig. 1 (f) À0.0030 4 0.0205 Fig. 1 (g) 0.0073 Fig. 1 (h) 0.0019 Table 2 SSIM values between each pair of shares generated by the proposed scheme. Fig. 1(e) 0.0105 0.0108 0.0089 Fig. 1(f) 0.0015 0.0208 Fig. 1(g) 0. 0103 Collusion attack [18] : The proposed scheme can easily resist collusion attack as at the beginning each of the participants has to pass the verification phase (step 2 of Section 3.3). Even if two participants A i and A j plan to recover the original secret image by exchanging their S ei and S ej values, their conspiracy will be identified as each of participants A i have provided their unique identity number ID i to the dealer and published ID i ; s ei a; b ð Þ f g . This type conspiracy can easily be detected by other participants. Thus proposed scheme is robust against collusion attack.
Merit of the proposed scheme
To further assess the performance of the proposed scheme, comparisons among the proposed scheme and the other related schemes [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] are listed in Table 3 . The virtues of the proposed scheme are drawn as follows: À ÁMÂN k . In contrast, the probability of Thien-Lin [6] and Chen-Fu 
À ÁMÂN
k . Extra storage and distortion free recovery: To avoid the truncation distortion and lossless recovery, the schemes [6, 7] divide one pixel into two and used extra storage to storage than new pixel. On the other hand, the proposed scheme and the schemes [9, 10] can recover the original secret image losslessly without extra storage. Though the scheme [8] does not use any extra storage, but recovery is not lossless. Shadow size: The shadows of our scheme are little larger than the schemes [6] [7] [8] [9] but smaller (for k > 3) than ChenFu's scheme [10] .
Our proposed verifiable secret image sharing approach has the following properties:
1. The proposed scheme can produce the highly confidential encrypted shadows. 2. The generated shadow images are smaller in size with respect to the secret image. 3. The secret image can be perfectly reconstructed from any k different shadows. 4. The original secret image cannot be reconstructed when any (k À 1) fewer shadows are gathered. 5. Each shadow is verifiable by others and thus no secure channel is required. 6. The proposed scheme can easily resist brute force attack and collusion attack.
The theoretical analysis and experimental results show that our proposed approach gives the above excellent properties.
Conclusion
Secret image sharing is an effective scheme which provides confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive image. In this paper a novel verifiable secret image sharing scheme based on the (k, n) threshold and 3rd order LFSR-based public key cryptosystem is proposed. This new VSISS generates meaningless shares, which are hard to identify. It can also prevent cheating in the existing secret image sharing schemes and robust against brute force attack and collusion attack. The size of each shadow image is relatively small (k > 3). What is more, the proposed system can reconstruct the original secret without any loss and for that it does not load any additional memory. Experimental results and analyses indicate the strength and efficiency of the proposed scheme. 
